扒哥吃瓜

IN THE WEST MIDLANDS TRAFFIC AREA

IN THE MATTER OF CAMBABEST LTD 鈥� OD0203905

BEFORE THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER MR M DORRINGTON

PUBLIC INQUIRY ON 06 MAY 2026

AT THE OFFICE OF THE TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER IN BIRMINGHAM

WRITTEN DECISION

BACKGROUND

Cambabest Ltd (鈥渢he operator鈥�) were granted a restricted operator鈥檚 licence in 1993 under reference OD0203905. On 19 January 2026 Vehicle Examiner Matthews undertook a fleet inspection and in doing so issued two immediate and one delayed prohibition. He also noted the operator had seven vehicles recorded on the operator鈥檚 licence but the operator also had VRM PO13 NMA that was not specified (because there was no authority on the licence for an eight vehicle) but the vehicle had been in use since 28 May 2025. Vehicle Examiner Matthews then undertook a MIVR on 05 February 2026 that scored the operator as 鈥淩eport to OTC鈥�. Upon receipt of that MIVR a decision was made to call the operator to a public inquiry.

PUBLIC INQUIRY 06 MAY 2026

Present on behalf of the operator were both directors; Mr Satbander Pnaiser and Mr Kalbinder Pnaiser. Also present were Mr Gurpal Pnaiser (general manager), Devinder Manku (responsible person) and Mr Kasad Ali (consultant).

Present on behalf of the DVSA was Vehicle Examiner Matthews.

After hearing evidence from multiple witnesses, and after considering closing submissions made on behalf of the operator, I retired to consider whether I could reach a decision on the day. Given the lack of time, and the serious nature of the evidence before me, I reserved my decision.

BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

The burden of proof is upon the DVSA and/or Office of the Traffic Commissioner to prove any allegations that have been made. The standard of proof is the civil law test; the balance of probabilities. In other words what is more likely than not to have occurred.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND REASONS

I have made the following findings of fact after applying the correct burden and standard of proof to the evidence that is before me. For the avoidance of any doubt all of my findings of fact can be taken to start with the words 鈥淚t is more likely than not that鈥︹��

Mr Satbander Pnaiser accepted all of the failings identified by the DVSA and the Police. In relation to the DVSA evidence, despite me telling him several times that if their evidence was not challenged it would be deemed to be accepted, there was no challenge to any of the evidence given by Vehicle Examiner Matthews.

The DVSA evidence was credible, cogent and highly persuasive and I accepted it as such. Since it was not challenged I find that all of the allegations made by the DVSA are proven.

The evidence from the Police was credible, cogent and highly persuasive and I accepted it as such. Since it was not challenged I find that all of the allegations made by the Police are proven.

I repeat all of the proven DVSA and all of the proven Police allegations and adopt them all as my own findings of fact. Principle amongst them are:

• At the fleet inspection by VE Matthews on 19 January 2026 two immediate and one delayed prohibition were issued. This proves that vehicles in service were not in a fit and serviceable condition and road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• At that same fleet inspection VE Matthews found VRM PO13 NMA was not specified on the licence. It was an eighth vehicle that had been in use since 28 May 2025; it therefore proves that the operator had been operating more vehicles that it was licensed to operate and that the operator was parking more vehicles at its operating centre than were authorized. The operating centre only has permission to park seven vehicles; and
• On 04 February vehicle PJ64 ADV was stopped and issued with an immediate and delayed prohibition with no evidence of a first use inspection having been undertaken by the driver and the DDR sheet for 03 February recorded 鈥淣il鈥� defects. This proves that the vehicle was in service when not in a fit and roadworthy condition and that the driver had failed to do any first use inspection of the vehicle on 04 February 2026. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• The MIVR on 05 February 2026 undertaken by VE Matthews scored the operator as 鈥淩eport to OTC鈥� in four areas and 鈥淯nsatisfactory鈥� in six other areas. In other words 10/13 areas of compliance looked at were scored as being unsatisfactory or worse; and
• At the MIVR fleet inspection further immediate and delayed prohibitions were issued, again proving that vehicles in service were not in a fit and serviceable condition. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• PMI sheets looked at by VE Matthews showed vehicles returned to service when the roadworthiness declaration had not been signed, no meaningful brake tests had been undertaken and PMI inspection intervals had been stretched by up to 24 days. This was clear evidence that vehicles were not being kept in a fit and serviceable condition. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result.
• No or no effective driver defect reporting system was in place with clear examples identified by VE Matthews of vehicles being kept in service with known defects present. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• From 12 MOT tests the operator had an initial fail rate of 41.67% when the national average initial fail rate was just 11.05%. An MOT is the one day of the year, known about in advance, when a vehicle must meet the bare minimum standard of roadworthiness. To fail a MOT this often proves that vehicles were being poorly maintained and poorly prepared for MOT and it also proves that the vehicle was in service previously to the MOT with the MOT failure defects present; in other words it was in service when it was not in a roadworthy condition. If it had been in a roadworthy condition then it would have passed the MOT. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• There was no evidence of any wheel or tyre management system in place. In that respect there was no evidence of a torque and re-torquing log. The operator promised to purchase a wheel torque but took until 15 April 2026 (date on the invoice) to do so. I fully agree with VE Matthews鈥� oral evidence that it is more likely than not that from the time of the MIVR to 15 April at least one, if not several, wheels will have needed to have been re-torqued. From the lack of an any, or any effective, wheel/tyre management policy and with the lack of a torque wrench road safety had been put at real risk; and
• There was no evidence of any load security training. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result and will, in due course, be shown to have been found by the Police to have been put at actual risk; and
• The 鈥渞esponsible person鈥� on this licence had no control to ensure the undertakings on the licence were being fulfilled. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• Despite all the assurances for change made by the operator in its response to the MIVR, vehicle DX16 MFU was stopped by the Police on 13 March 2026 and was found to be in a dangerous condition due to its insecure load. After the promises made in response to the MIVR this incident should never have happened. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• Despite this incident the same vehicle, driven by the same driver, was stopped again by the Police on 21 April 2026 and was found to be in a dangerous condition because of the insecure load. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• Despite the promises made after the MIVR the operator had not ensured compliance with the undertakings on its operator鈥檚 licence as evidenced by the DVSA supplemental statement from VE Matthews. This supplemental statement clearly scored the operator鈥檚 compliance as being unsatisfactory since not all of the evidence requested in the Case Management Directions had been provided, there were still issues with PMI sheets with several not recording any brake test (when a laden brake test was required at all PMIs from 01 April 2025 as per paragraph 5.3 of the Guide To Maintaining Roadworthiness in order to comply with regulation 18 of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986) and in some cases brake tests were completed after the date of the PMI but the PMI roadworthiness declaration had been signed before the date of that brake test (it should not have been as the mechanic could not know the vehicle was roadworthy on the date of signing the declaration if no brake test had been completed at that point in time) and 鈥渄river defect reporting is still very poor鈥� with reasons for reaching that conclusion given by VE Matthews including the fact that 83% of PMIs looked at had driver spotable defects present . Road safety continued to be put at real risk as a result of the adverse findings made in the supplemental statement of VE Matthews; and
• In the public inquiry only one torque record was evidenced. I do not accept as being remotely credible the assertion that since the MIVR on 05 February only one wheel would have needed to have been (re)torqued. Road safety had been put at real risk as a result; and
• This is a classic case of promises made and promises broken by this operator; and
• The operator鈥檚 consultant, Mr Ali, was first appointed in May 2025 and told me that one of the first things he identified was that there was no one within the transport operation with the required knowledge. Yet it took Mr Satbander Pnaiser until 18 April 2026 to complete an OLAT course. It is clear to me that had either of the two directors completed an OLAT course in the summer of 2025 there was likely to have been a significant improvement in compliance then. To wait this long having had the issue brought to their attention by Mr Ali beggars belief; and

• The following undertakings recorded on the operator鈥檚 licence were being breached as at the time of the MIVR:

• Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition
• Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing
• Records are kept (for at least 15 months) of all driver reports that record defects, and all safety inspection, routine maintenance and vehicle repair reports, and that these are made available on request.
• The number of vehicles and trailers kept at each operating centre specified will not exceed the maximum number authorised

Between the MIVR and the date of the public inquiry the following undertakings recorded on the operator鈥檚 licence were being/had been breached:

• Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept in a fit and serviceable condition
• Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing
• Records are kept (for at least 15 months) of all driver reports that record defects, and all safety inspection, routine maintenance and vehicle repair reports, and that these are made available on request.
• The number of vehicles and trailers kept at each operating centre specified will not exceed the maximum number authorised

In other words there was no material/significant improvement in compliance as at the date of the public inquiry.

BALANCING EXERCISE

There were positives in this case as at the date of the public inquiry 鈥� Mr Satbander Pnaiser said he would read the GTMR publication, drivers had been given toolbox training, a thorough VOR policy had been introduced, changes had been made to the maintenance provider, Mr Ali would remain as a consultant to undertake more hours with the operator on a weekly basis, spot checks were being completed on driver first use inspections, the operator was looking at introducing real time digital defect reporting and Mr Satbander Pnaiser had completed an OLAT course on 18 April 2026 and that they would join the Road Haulage Association. I have given as much credit (evidential weight) to these positive features as I can.

Shortly after the public inquiry the caseworker received an email from the operator and attached to it were two documents that the operator asked me to take into consideration. Exceptionally I have allowed that though it is not normal procedure to consider evidence received after a public inquiry has finished since my decision relates to how I found the operator as at the date of the public inquiry, not thereafter, and any evidence received after the public inquiry has finished cannot be tested in the hearing.

I have therefore given some, but not much, weight to that further evidence. The weight I have given relates to matters that had already been brought to my attention in the inquiry. Therefore additional credit is given for confirmation that the operator is now a member of the Road Haulage Association and that they will be used to undertake CPD training and real time driver defect reporting, that a new consultant, Andrew Catell, is being used, that weekly torque checks are being completed and recorded and that there is greater effort placed upon ensuring maintenance standards are improved including the first time pass rate at MOT.

Having carefully balanced the weight I have given to the positives in this case (meaningful weight) against the weight I have attached to the long standing road safety related negative findings (significant weight) it is clear that the balance only tips in one direction; in favour of the negative findings. Consideration of regulatory action is required.

CONSIDERATION OF STATUTORY DOCUMENT NUMBER 10, ANNEX 4

I have then considered Annex 4 of statutory document 4 issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner for Great Britain.

I have repeated all of my findings, including those that relate to the credit I have given to the operator. Having done so I have placed this operator into the 鈥淪evere to Serious鈥� category for consideration of regulatory action which is defined as 鈥淧ersistent operator licence failures with inadequate response or previous public inquiry.鈥� This operator meets the definition due to its persistent failures and inadequate response and in my determination falls more in the 鈥淪evere鈥� category than the 鈥淪erious鈥� one given the longstanding risk it posed to road safety and the promises made in response to the MIVR that were clearly broken.

The regulatory action to be considered when an operator falls into the 鈥淪evere to Serious鈥� category is detailed as follows:

• Revocation with detailed consideration of disqualification.
• Suspension for an extended time period that materially affects the transport operation or (if the case is more in the 鈥淪erious鈥� category) suspension of up to 28 days.
• Significant indefinite curtailment that materially affects the transport operation or (if the case is more in the 鈥淪erious鈥� category) significant time limited curtailment that may materially affect the transport operation.

DECISIONS AND REASONS

I have reminded myself about what the operator told me would be the likely effect of taking each type of regulatory action. I have also reminded myself that the operator was told in the calling in letter dated 01 April 2026 to consider making contingency plans including for the loss of the operator鈥檚 licence. As at today, 01 June 2026, the operator has had two clear months to consider contingency plans.

I also remind myself that the operator had not properly looked into sub-contracting the work that required a regulated vehicle since the operator鈥檚 evidence on this issue was that they had only spoken to a few haulage companies and when pressed by myself conceded that it would cost money and would be expensive. I was not persuaded that it was not possible to subcontract some of the work that required a regulated vehicle.

I have then asked myself the Priority Freight question which, after repeating all of my findings, I have determined is proportionate to answer in the operator鈥檚 favour, but only just. That is because there is just enough evidence before me that this operator (a) may have started to turn a corner in relation to compliance and (b) has demonstrated from that evidence that it is committed to being compliant. Therefore there is real hope that this operator will become and will then remain compliant going forward.

Having answered the Priority Freight question in the operator鈥檚 favour I can step back from revoking the operator鈥檚 licence.

I next need to consider the most suitable, and proportionate, regulatory action that will compel the operator to become compliant quickly and which will create a real chance that the operator will remain compliant on an ongoing basis.

I have determined that a suspension of this licence would not achieve that regulatory outcome as the operator would get its full licence authorization back at the end of the period of suspension regardless of whether it was compliant or not.

I have next considered a curtailment of the licence. Given that the operator is not able to operate its existing fleet of聽 seven vehicles to a compliant standard it makes regulatory sense to consider reducing the size of the operator鈥檚 fleet of vehicles to (a) one that I feel it could be capable of operating to a compliant standard and (b) that until it proved, with independent tangible evidence, that it could operate a reduced fleet to a compliant standard it would not be able to increase its vehicle fleet size thus reducing the risk to road safety.

I have also considered what other, compliant and well informed, operators would think if I did not take robust regulatory action. There is a real risk that some of them 聽would start to consider why they bothered spending the time, money and effort in remaining compliant when no robust regulatory action would be taken by the Traffic Commissioner if they were caught. A real erosion of trust in the system and in its perceived purpose would result.

I have also considered what a well informed member of the public might think if I did not take robust regulatory action; there is a real risk that they would lose confidence in a jurisdiction designed to protect, above all other things, road safety.

As this case falls more in the 鈥淪evere鈥� category than the 鈥淪erious鈥� category I have determined that the most appropriate and proportionate regulatory action is to curtail this licence from a 7 (seven) vehicle authorization to a 5 (five) vehicle authorization on a permanent basis. That regulatory action marks the gravity of this operator鈥檚 non-compliance, the risk it posed to road safety and the breach of trust it created from the promises made and then broken. It is also a clear marker on this operator鈥檚 file and it sends the right message out to well informed compliant operators and members of the public.

It also means that the operator cannot simply wait out a time limited curtailment and then get its vehicular authorization back regardless of whether it was compliant or not.

I do not consider this to be a revocation by the back door. There was no persuasive evidence before me to suggest the same. I do not think it is regulatory action that will create an insurmountable problem to this operator as there was also no persuasive evidence before me that the operator could not either sub-contract some of its regulated transport work to fill the loss of two vehicles or that it could not simply use more 3,500kg vehicles either in tandem with a sub-contracted third party haulier or alone.

I fully accept that this is likely to cause the operator a financial cost that might be regarded as expensive both in the cost of sub-contracting work and/or in the loss of some regular clients but that is not a reason for me step back from taking the regulatory action I have taken.

This operator needs to understand one simple thing; it has come as close as it ever could come to losing its operator鈥檚 licence.

I therefore curtail this operator鈥檚 licence from 7 (seven) vehicles to 5 (five) vehicles from 2345 hours on 30 June 2026 on a permanent basis under sections 26(1)(c)(iii), (e) and (f) of the Act. This order takes effect at 2345 hours on 30 June 2026. The operator will, by no later than 1400 hours on 14 June, notify my office as to the registration numbers of the two vehicles that are to be taken off the licence and by that same time and date the two corresponding discs must be received at my office. If the operator fails to comply then (a) the first two vehicles recorded on VOL will be removed from the licence and (b) a Traffic Examiner will be asked to seize the corresponding discs from the operator.

Cambabest Ltd鈥檚 fitness to hold an operator鈥檚 licence is marked as 鈥渟everely tarnished and hanging by the finest of threads but not lost鈥�.

The DVSA are asked to undertake an unannounced MIVR at some point in the next 3-18 months to examine maintenance compliance since the date of this last public inquiry. The operator is unequivocally warned that if that MIVR does not score the operator as 鈥渟atisfactory鈥� in every area examined then it will be called back to a second regulatory public inquiry.

No variation application to increase authorization will be considered under staff delegations. No variation application will have any realistic chance of being granted unless it is accompanied by a full maintenance and operator licence compliance audit undertaken by a competent and independent body that scores the operator as being 鈥渟atisfactory鈥� in every area audited. For the avoidance of any doubt a score of 鈥渕ostly satisfactory鈥� in any area audited will not suffice.

For the avoidance of any doubt the variation application submitted on 19 February 2026 is refused for all of the reasons given in this written decision and as a result of my decision.

WARNING AS TO IMPOUNDING

After 2345 hours on Friday 30 June 2026 this operator is only authorised to operate five vehicles. This operator has had a history of operating more vehicles than it was authorised to operate. 聽I unequivocally warn the operator that if it operates more than five vehicles after 2345 hours on 30 June 2026 then the DVSA have the power to impound that/those vehicle(s) because there is no valid operator鈥檚 licence that that/those vehicle(s) could be operated under and the DVSA are asked to do that and they are also asked to consider prosecuting the operator in the criminal courts as well.

Traffic Commissioner Mr M Dorrington

01 June 2026.